Isa Blumi
"The Macedonian Question presents, on the one hand, such a medley of jarring races, long standing animosities, and ever-recurring atrocities, and, on the other hand, such a jumble of ethnographical uncertainties, unreliable statistics, assertions and counter-assertions flatly contradictory on every point, that one almost despairs of an idea as to how it ought to be settled, of the hope of ever seeing it settled at all."
C.H. Haskins and R.H. Lord in Some Problems of the Peace Conference
1. LOCAL IDENTITY AND WESTERN DIPLOMACY
Manchevski's cinematic documentation of the seemingly timeless conflict between Slavs and Albanians in Macedonia has become one of the most evocative Western manifestations of its fascination with the "incomprehensible" Balkans. The movie Before the Rain resurrected emotions in the West which helped justify its diplomatic blunders and debilitating cynicism in the course of the recent Bosnian war. The cinema became a powerful medium for the articulation of the West's sense of helplessness as it confronted mass rape, concentration camps and ethnic cleansing with moral posturing and behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Tied to the cinematic representations of the Balkan madness was the reiteration of long-held stereotypes of the Balkans, long ago codified by Western literature's greatest voices. These links between the West's collective memory concerning the Balkans and the dismal diplomatic record of the international community are too numerous to dismiss.
Although the Clinton and Bush administrations'efforts to employ a collective security solution to contain 'ethnic' conflicts, deserve criticism, I am more concerned that the academic and diplomatic communities directly involved in analyzing the tensions in the Balkans have misinterpreted the meaning of the single most emphasized issue in the Balkans: ethnic identity. Western misconceptions of Macedonia, for instance, as being the next "ground zero" have been hardened by a pseudo-academic, cultural entity which explained the carnage seen on CNN with quick and often overly simplistic notions of an essential Balkan ethos. In the case of Macedonia, it is the ancient hatreds between monolithic ethnic communities-Slavs and Albanians-which created the artistic and theoretical template for war. Susan Woodward and Misha Glenny, among others, have reached all too familiar conclusions-albeit with variant persuasiveness-that suggest war between 'ethnic communities' in Macedonia would automatically spread over its borders into neighboring countries.
I am concerned the literature that has emphasized such tensions overstep the meaning of ethnicity in the Balkans and create the atmosphere within an academic and policy making milieu that has been uncritically presented by the mass media productions which focused on the issue. Our misconceptions of Macedonia as being "ground zero" have been hardened as European-financed films and misguided journalists incorrectly paint the region's conflicts along generational and historical lines that cannot be judged by the West's all too human and relativist morality. As a reaction to such determinism, the academic communities' theoretical responses have been less than productive, in fact, they have often been tainted by this logic of irreconsibility to the point of obstructing enlightened diplomacy.
Some theories have posited that ethnicity and crisis behavior lay within a synthesis of rationalized models of engagement while others submit all comprehension is unlikely to be possible in these "primordial" confrontations which are fundamentally alien to the pluralistic, Western world. By asserting that the storm brewing on Macedonia's horizon has a quality of inevitability-one could say a force of nature-the West finds the psychological space to provide itself a self-congratulatory air of neutrality by placing their "peace-keepers" between rivals in such doomed heterogeneous societies. In the same breath, the synthesis of "artistic and journalistic" representations with academic determinism suggests communal animosities in isolated regions of the world are resurrections, "ghosts" that haunt the dreams of regional leaders such as Milosevic who rely on ethnic appeals to mobilize support. The rational actions of a Milosevic, bordering on the madness of a Balkan spontaneity, suggest that his choice to mobilize national hatreds across borders is actually justified in light of an impending Islamic (read: nationalistic) swarm. Both the West's "systemic level" paradigms and the well-received artistic endeavors chronicling Balkan life juxtaposed to Western civility have clearly left the West more than comfortable with its sense of powerlessness. This analysis seeks to remind us that because of the misrepresentations of an essential Balkan character, the West's resulting impotence has dangerous and often explosive consequences in local conflicts such as Macedonia's. Part of the problem is the imposition of universal patterns of political and social action. "Nations" are expected to follow identifiable scenarios set within ahistorical essentializations of what constitutes a nation. Policy decisions are often based on these anticipations of communal interaction, in this case, Macedonia, which inherently expand the parameters of the conflict to political arenas which do not necessarily have the immediate links Western analysts assume. Aside from reminding us of the West's moral duty, there appears to be an opportunity (one the West, I am afraid, will tragically miss), to address future Balkan conflicts in a more responsible, historically conscious, manner. In this context, this analysis attempts to expose the fallacy of the West's understanding of a specific Balkan conflict by insisting that the conflict between Albanians and Macedonians is first and foremost a Macedonian problem and not necessarily a part of a regional pathology or an ethnic conflict that crosses international borders. I insist on isolating the Macedonian conflict between Slavs and Albanians in an attempt to discourage the West's reduction of Balkan politics to one of ethnic hatreds and its rational exploitation by demagogues. Instead, I hope to demonstrate that while a storm does loom ominously-a storm that uniquely covers Macedonia-it is not likely to spread over the Shar mountains or into Bulgaria as has been predicted. Rather, the confrontation between Albanians and Slav Macedonians is to remain, as long as the West itself does not encourage its expansion, within Macedonia. Ultimately, I hope to conclude that local conflicts such as this one, throughout the Balkans, are not dangerous sparks that ignite the powder keg of Western nightmares but outbreaks that should be policed by the world community in the confined arena of the actual adversaries. By theoretically keeping these conflicts within a regional arena, active diplomacy and purposeful arm-twisting on a local level could render these storms harmless, not only in places like Macedonia but the Balkans as a whole. To better understand why this is so, I dedicate much of this article to the history of the Albanian community in Macedonia and its relationship with various governing bodies since the formation of Yugoslavia during the interwar period. In conjunction, I will demonstrate why the West fails to understand the important cultural and economic divisions that exist between national groups, be it Serbs, Croatians, or in the case of this paper, Albanians in the Balkans. Simplifying this diverse community by making it a "national unit" that answers to the current regime in Tirana, is a problem that transcends the West's policies in the Balkans. Whether it has its origins in the arrogance of the colonial period or elsewhere, the misguided interpretation of national identity wrecks havoc to indigenous mechanisms of conflict management. We have regional specialists today influencing policy with overly exaggerated notions of nationalist sympathies that most probably blind politicians and career diplomats to the level of disjuncture between regional communities. Take Duncan Perry's observation on Macedonia:
"Macedonia, the population of which is roughly one-third Albanian, is in a delicate and precarious position. Should the Albanians, who are already seeking functional autonomy, decide that the republic is not viable, they could try to unite with Albania along with the province of Kosovo in Serbia [sic] whose population is 90 percent Albanian. This could lead to a Balkan war, for neither Serbia nor Macedonia would stand quietly by as their territories were dismembered."
Such simplifications dehistoricize the local conflicts and create a reference which obscures local mechanisms of conflict resolution. Albanians in Macedonia could never rely on other Albanians in areas historically distinct from their own. To insist on using the ethnic composite as the means of identification, one is very likely to obscure the differences that exist between communities in Kosova, Macedonia and Albania itself. Thus, Western efforts to "contain" ethnic conflicts are often rendered hostage to reactionary discourses emanating from Tirana, Skopje and Belgrade, mistakenly integrating outside elements into a decisively local issue. Understanding the different historical trajectories of Albanian and Slavic populations may help influence Western conclusions about the inevitable spread of regional conflicts, hopefully dissuading Western diplomats from essentializing the role of national identity and focusing their attention to local options of conflict resolution.
2. THE ROOTS OF THE CURRENT TROUBLES IN MACEDONIA
This leads us to the immediate causes of the current conflict in Macedonia. I draw a direct link to the inherent weaknesses of the Albanian community in Macedonia with the persistent tensions between the Slav and Albanian communities over the definition of state power. I believe it serves no theoretical or diplomatic purpose to separate the effects of a demystified notion of communal identity and its inherent weaknesses from the action taken by a rival community seeking to exploit those weaknesses. Institutionalized distrust between Albanians in their respective communities and their Slavic neighbors became a function of state repression and a spark to ignite nationalist fears as late as the 1980s throughout Slav-dominated Yugoslavia. Historiographically, these tensions have taken international dimensions. The West's understanding of intercommunal relations in Yugoslavia have been largely shaped by authors who have used such mythologies as rhetorical devices. By understanding the inherent divisions among Albanian communities, the Yugoslav state made effective use of disunity to help promote state projects throughout the postwar years and project images of adequate force for outside audiences which spoke of impending ethnic clashes. These same policies found coherence in the independent republics after the fall of Federal Yugoslavia. In the 1950s, preliminary attempts to form a Soviet-style society in the Balkans aided Tito's head of security, Aleksandar Rankovic, in asserting a new pattern of institutionalized violence on the non-Slavic populations. The distinctive area in Western Macedonia, while composed of an overwhelming majority of Albanians, was not administratively joined to Kosova (reflecting historical boundaries) due to a clear objection on the part of Slav Macedonians who challenged the historicity of linking the two regions, an argument that suited Tito's interests in having not an Albanian dominated political entity within Yugoslavia. The administrative boundaries, inherited more or less from the Ottoman period, served well to divide Albanians at the very moment they began to express firm distrust in Partisan and subsequent Yugoslav political forces especially after the massacres committed by special forces in 1945-1946 in Kosova and other territories populated with Albanians. Rankovic understood that Albanians, historically detached by these boundaries, would not likely coalesce politically when they, again, constituted different political entities within the Yugoslav federal system. As a consequence, a history which extends to the interwar period of harassment continued throughout the repressive years of Rankovic's reign with little or no collective all-Albanian response.
There are theoretical considerations to be made that may help illuminate the level of institutional interference levied on the Albanian population in Macedonia. The logic behind this article is to generate a tone from which contemporary issues may have greater meaning for those interested in resolving these tensions. I hope I have established the fact elsewhere that Albanians of the prewar period had little history of communal harmony nor experience in what may be called national cohesion. The lack of homogeneity as well as turbulent internal politics informed by tribal and/or economic rivalries often manifested themselves into political regimes of "disunity." Respective historical actors, from Rankovic to the Gligorov coalition government, have reinforced divisive threads between Albanian communities for the general purpose of political hegemony in their particular contexts.
In conjunction with an institutional project to sustain a viable singular state, beneath the surface there were nefarious racial and nationalist agendas at play. Of the many policies of Rankovic, forced emigration has been particularly challenging to document. There were attempts by Belgrade and the leaders of Macedonia to dilute the level of Albanian and Turkish populations throughout the Republic. Through a series of agreements signed with the Turkish government, "voluntary" repatriation would take place in an official attempt to ethnically purify Slav-held lands. As official statistics suggest, this policy of the "repatriation" of ethnic Turks really constituted expulsions of large numbers of Albanians (purposefully labeled Turks) for a period of over 15 years. Ethnic cleansing, forced migration, or "repatriation" are nothing new to the former Yugoslavia. What made this particular version successful was its seemingly "voluntary" nature. By now we know that this was just the façade and the pressures on Albanians to migrate to Turkey or elsewhere were unbearable.
Somewhat paradoxically, in an effort to placate Macedonian Albanians remaining in Yugoslavia and strengthen the Federal government's efforts to use ethnic rivalries to maintain a peaceful coexistence (and central power), Belgrade and then a largely unwilling Skopje enacted a cynical policy of 'Brotherhood and Unity' which granted Albanians access to limited Albanian language education and cultural rights. By all measures this policy would seem to satisfy any reasonable Albanian in Macedonia. By 1981, always according to the official data, there were 287 Albanian language elementary schools with over 74,000 pupils in Macedonia. In addition to this apparent success, there were Albanian language radio and television programs, a newspaper and cultural associations in Macedonia.
By all measures, the picture in Macedonia was not quite so harmonious as it would seem. Discrimination was prevalent in the educational system and employment and representation in all party agencies were numerically low. The problem of education was of particular concem since its role in Yugoslavia at the time was an indoctrinating one. Without access to the halls of party power, closely linked to the successful passage through the educational system, Albanians in Macedonia had no hope of participating in the decision-making process of their society. As is the case today, the central issue in education was the use of Albanian as a language of instruction. Instruction at the university level in the Albanian language was offered only in the teacher's training school. More profoundly, Macedonian enjoyed a secure place as the national language and reciprocal language learning was hardly encouraged in non-Albanian schools. Therefore, while cultural divides persisted, the clear pattern of discrimination reached the highest levels of daily life. Due to the lack of higher-level educational services, finding meaningful employment was next to impossible and influence in Party decisions was all but non-existent for Albanians. Until 1965 not one Albanian or Turk was included in the Macedonian Party executive committee. In 1959, almost 85 percent of the Party members were Slav Macedonian although their "nationality" represented less than two-thirds of the population. Albanians and Turks, combined, represented only 2.29%. This pattern of institutional isolation has found resilience and persists today. For example even in the areas that are overwhelmingly Albanian only four per cent of the police forces are Albanians. There are no Albanian members of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences, neither in any of the Institutes that study their culture and history. In more than 40 scientific Institutes and three major Universities work only three Albanian assistant profesors. Therefore, while Albanians were granted a degree of constitutional protection, the use of Albanian language contradicted with other, clear ethnic policies of division.
Throughout the postwar period, the institutional dominance by Slav party members pursuing watered-down ethnic and cultural politics weighted, in particular, Albanian and Slav relations. While it may be argued that Albanians mistrusted the hegemonic Communist Party, as many Albanian revisionist will swear was the case, the fact remains that extensive mistrust and a fear bordering on paranoia reflected Slav attitudes towards Albanians, not only in Macedonia but throughout Yugoslavia, both within the state and throughout the population, while many Albanians were eager to integrate into the system. The Slav Macedonian state, for one, justified its discriminatory policy by accusing those Albanians who demanded a greater role in society to be puppets for Enver Hoxha's regime. Comparing this attitude with conversations today we see time does not change the dynamic of the relationship between the state and the Albanian community. In due time, periodic tensions became expressions of violence. After such periods of violence, attempts by the central government to rectify some of the underlying discrepancies usually resulted in only encouraging a greater level of frustration since these reforms were never sincerely implemented. The events of 1968, for instance, may provide useful examples of this systemic failure to resolve inherent problems during the Federal Republic. This period may also serve as a reminder to Western policy makers that contrary to their understanding of "nationalism" Albanians in Yugoslavia had distinctively local agendas and rarely interacted in constructive ways against the repressive state.
Reflecting the shifting dynamics of domestic politics, in 1968 Belgrade granted Albanians the right to fly their own flag alongside the Yugoslav flag, (all other national groups had won that right years earlier). On November 27, a day before Albania's independence day, serious riots broke out in Prishtina, the capital of Kosova. As these riots took place, in neighboring Macedonia, calm prevailed, all but ignoring the spirit of the Kosovars struggle to the North. A period of mass arrests resulted in an exodus of Kosovar Albanians and Albanians from Macedonia that lived in Kosova to the relatively quiet Macedonia in search of sanctuary from Serb and Yugoslav "security" forces. On December 22, riots broke out in Tetova, constituting a "nationalist" display never before seen in the Macedonian Republic. Albanian flags flew from minarets and shop windows as troops from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) were sent in to restore order.
There are two observations to be made of these events in 1968. First, I would be willing to submit that many of the principal actors in the Tetova riots were actually Kosovars who had fled Prishtina three weeks earlier. If this is true, it would suggest a level of collaboration between members of both communities but paradoxically, I would suggest it also demonstrates how distanced the two Albanian communities really were. So little of the "passion" and sense of resentment that resonated in Kosova registered in Tetova at the time of the 1968 riots in Prishtina. The fact that riots of a similar nature took place in Tetova three weeks later is probably a reflection of the new influx of Kosovar activists rather than a sign of a new sense of activism on the part of local Albanians. This remarkable lack of cohesiveness would surface repeatedly as Kosovars continued to confront Serb oppression while Albanians in Macedonia sat passively on the sidelines. Contrary to Duncan Perry's assertion in the quote I cited above, the violence in Kosova in 1981, 1986, and 1990 never inspired a response from Macedonia. Viewing this, the West must learn to react to situations in Kosova as separate from those in Macedonia.
An explanation for this lack of coherence is solidly located in the persistent historical boundaries levied by various states Ottoman, Yugoslav and Macedonian. These boundaries aided in the solidification of distinctive communal characteristics which manifested themselves most vividly in the disparities in how each community confronted the state. Unlike Albanians in Kosova, Albanians in Macedonia have relied much more on the mechanism within Macedonian party politics (despite their limited influence) and the state to express their local concerns. From party functionaries in the Communist era to Party for Democratic Prosperity (PPD) leaders today, community leadership has never demonstrated a will to join a greater Albanian conflict with Slav forces. In the late 1960s, Azem Zulfiçari, the Albanian member of the Yugoslav Communist Party's (LCY) Central Committee from Macedonia counseled Albanians of Macedonia that they should not seek their interests and their rights outside the S.R. Macedonia but within it "...in active participation and efforts for strengthening the material basis and developing socialist, democratic and self- management relations." Today, Albanian moderates within the PPD seek to maintain similar contact with the Macedonian state through constructive dialogue and forming a key part to the Gligorov coalition government. This direct approach contradicts the parallel state formed by the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) in Kosova. To any outside observer, this is a model of "disunity" and to Belgrade and Skopje respectively, this is a very welcomed sign of weakness. As a result, Albanians today are isolated in Macedonia. Without productive and informed diplomacy, attempts by the West to resolve future tensions in Macedonia may result in violent failure, in part because it invariably focused its attention to 'larger' constituencies.
A second observation one can make about the 1968 events is the general (and convenient) conclusion by Serb and Slav Macedonian authorities that Enver Hoxha was behind the violent uprising. Through a vigorous anti-Hoxha (and thus anti-Albanian) campaign, Slav Macedonian civilians had been fed racist and inflammatory remarks about Albanians, a practice of institutionalized hatred which transcends historical eras. Another clear example of such attacks appeared when "communal" tensions again took a negative turn after the uprising in Kosova in 1981. Macedonian officials made unprovoked public attacks against many individuals despite the fact there had been no significant political disturbances in Macedonia. Those attacks ultimately led to the imprisonment of Albanian cultural figures who had been articulating Albanian concerns within peaceful forums. The federal state, through the LCY organ, Borba, tied threats to national security with arrests like these and often demanded a renewed effort to quell Albanian demands for a separate education. Such demands took precedence in Macedonian ethnic policies. Following an earlier law stipulating that secondary classes with Albanian as the language of instruction could only be created if over 30 Albanian pupils enrolled, the state began an aggressive enforcement campaign. The impact of this law is clear: in 1981 there were 8200 pupils attending Albanian classes, by the end of 1988 that figure dropped to 4221. Many of the students and instructors participating in such Albanian language courses which did not fit the requirements boycotted the Macedonian-only courses taught in their place. While Kosova at the time still had Prishtina University and a functional secondary school system for its Albanian citizens, Macedonian authorities took an active part in incarcerating those who refused to accept the sudden reversal of educational policies towards non-Slav Macedonian groups. It is fruitful to make these observations in the context of Gligorov's failure to supplant a policy of communal harmony without institutional changes in state policy: the Communist-era oppression of Albanian educational needs is still being institutionally persecuted today.
Aside from education, which has become the central point of confrontation in an independent Macedonia, a concerted anti-Muslim campaign first began in 1980 and quickly degenerated into a vociferous attack on the permissibility of Islam in the Balkans. Seen as traitors, stereotypes of Muslims matured into dangerous accusations and violent repression of their religious practices. Laws were amended to restrict access to organized religious instruction and in Macedonia they were especially harsh. These laws were clearly meant for Muslims since the Macedonian Orthodox Church never faced police harassment before or after the break up of Yugoslavia; one might say that it was the official policy to help it take roots. For Muslims, and the majority of Albanians living in Macedonia, the destruction of "unauthorized" mosques and the violent break-up of "illegal" religious gatherings were becoming precursors to a new level of social and economic division. Throughout the 1980s, the aim of "Brotherhood and Unity" legitimized by Tito had been completely usurped by Macedonian nationalist efforts. The active campaigns of both Macedonian and Serb anti-Albanian attacks since 1986 resulted in increased alienation and subsequently disunity throughout Yugoslavia. In 1989, the Macedonian authorities added to the atmospherics of chauvinism, by amending the republic's constitution to redefine the Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Macedonia as a 'nation-state of Macedonian people' instead of the previous formulation which defined it as a collective state with Macedonian people and Albanian and Turkish minorities. A history of systemic inadequacies and enfeebled institutional resilience resulted in the rescinding of even the façade of ethnic cohabitation for the growing Albanian population in Macedonia. While there has been a history of persistent state pressure on the Albanian population in Macedonia, the reasons I share fears with others about Macedonia lie in a combination of factors that currently shape how the Macedonian state chooses to handle its domestic problems in the context of how events unfolded to the North. The enormous specter of human tragedy in the Balkans has undergone periods of inexplicable obscurity on the world scene. Occupied by Hollywood trials, a disinterested public had hardly noticed the cultural purification of Croatia and Bosnia solidified by the Dayton accords. It may be years before we fully see the extent of the damage done to the integrity of heterogeneous communities like Bosnia-Herzegovina but the acquiescence to "ethnic purification" instigated by the international community with elections have long term effects on the southern Balkans, especially, on Macedonia.
As may be surmised from the popularized histories being read, there is both stagnation and a dynamism to Macedonian history. With the signing of an agreement between Macedonia and Greece, the international conflicts that threatened the Macedonian state and their significance to Slav Macedonians and a large Albanian minority have been dramatically affected. The resolution of President Gligorov's single most challenging problem may have consequences that resonate for years as a renewed sense of confidence among Slav Macedonians emerges. A part of this new confidence emanates from the events occurring in Bosnia. As of yet locked behind the doors of diplomatic tact, I suggest new standards in chauvinism and inflammatory rhetoric have begun emerge from the legitimized halls of state power in Skopje. In conjunction to the rhetoric, Slav Macedonians may actively seek to restore or strengthen Communist-era restrictions on ethnic minorities in Macedonia as their political agenda changes to reflect a new air of confidence.
3. RECENT SIGNS OF THE STORM
Since the formal break from the Yugoslav Republic, the signs of such ethnic chauvinism have been numerous. On November 6, 1992 at Bit Pazar in Skopje, the Macedonian police shot dead three Albanians in an incident that would exemplify the willingness of Macedonian security forces to use violence against Albanians. While the confrontation at Bit Pazar was not representative of the central problem between Albanians and the state, it did magnify the tolerance level of the Macedonian authorities for violence towards Albanians. In fact, that willingness to use deadly force has been manifested on several other occasions. The most telling point of contention between the communities has been in the resurrection of old confrontations on Albanian culture and education. As stated earlier, Albanians have had demands in Macedonia for an Albanian language education since the 1950s. Unfortunately, despite the fact that President Gligorov was faced with economic catastrophe if tensions between the state and Macedonia's Albanians escalated, he did not risk confronting his own radical constituents by addressing fundamental Albanian demands on education, and administrative and economic issues. In another example of a dangerous stalemate, early in 1995, Skopje took another step towards communal conflict by literally destroying the building which housed the Albanian-language university at Tetova. While the building was not "authorized" by the state for such purposes, the subsequent incarceration of university leaders and the shooting death of an Albanian protester heightened tensions between Albanians and the Slav state. In a typical reaction, a furious round of Western journalism and diplomacy followed as all signs pointed to the spreading of the Bosnian conflict into Macedonia. Unfortunately, one of the most glaring failures in these Western overtures as peace-brokers has been its lack of historical analysis. The attention the West gave to outside figures such as Sali Berisha, the now-deposed president of a harmless Albanian state, has exaggerated the role of such "national" leaders, undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of local leaders and focused the attention of EU and UN negotiators on external, not necessarily related issues. Slav Macedonians have used to great effect this reinforced imagery of irredentist neighbors and "Islamic Fundamentalism" to deflect criticism of abuse. We can expect more violent confrontations between Skopje and Macedonia's Albanians in light of the combined pragmatism and fatalism of the Bosnian affair. The Western public celebration and self-congratulatory attitudes over the final months of the war do not fool those in the Balkans. Among those with whom I have communicated in the Balkans, they all, from Croats in Zagreb, Albanians in Peja, to Slav Macedonians in Struga, have learned a very important lesson from Bosnia: The West is incapable and politically unwilling to defend its liberal ideals nor punish those who exploit this weakness. Ultimately, the clouds over Macedonia may bleed because the West cannot apply direct pressure.
As recent as August of 1995, before the Dayton Accords, the embargo on Macedonia to the South and the de facto embargo to the North left the Gligorov regime and Slav Macedonians little choice but to open and sustain trade routes with Bulgaria and Albania. The irony has to be pointed out that both Bulgaria and Albania, probably the two most stable countries in the region at the time were, according to most analysts, the principal threats to the nascent Macedonian Republic. In reality, Sali Berisha and Zhelyu Mitev Zhelev had proven to be the most responsible and cooperative Balkan leaders in a crisis instigated by a member of the European Union and NATO, Greece. Rather than exploit Macedonia's weaknesses and gain major concessions for their own presumed nationalistic goals, the two countries opened their borders without making unreasonable demands, seeking greater regional cooperation (neither had any choice I might add) rather than heightened tensions. No doubt these reliable Balkan allies were pressured by their economic benefactors; however, the cooperation and ultimately, Macedonia's rescue was a Balkan effort made between presumed enemies. It is telling that by reading the prognosis coming from the West, we were all resigned to seeing the war in the Balkans spread because of Macedonia's vulnerability, in part due to its internal weaknesses and external nationalistic pressures. None of this happened in large part because the dynamics of power in the Balkans resides first and foremost in immediate geographical and historical terms. Communal identity and interests has conformed to what history has given its participants. The West, on a consistent basis, has exaggerated the voracity of a variety of "social" and "historical" forces in the Balkans. As outside observers, we are left to believe the savagery of Zeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan) the prototype of the Serb warrior in Bosnia is synonymous with Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia, which simply diverts our attention from the internal mechanisms available to Western brokers of peace which could be activated to avert local war. Despite the positive signs of regional cooperation, hardly mentioned in the Western press, there still remain the significant failures for which Gligorov and his Albanian counterparts must take responsibility. Generally, the most telling factor in Macedonia's problems is Gligorov's policies towards the large minority groups in Macedonia. In a period of muted desperation, Gligorov had an opportunity, with radical nationalists silenced by embargoes, economic chaos and war next door, to create a viable relationship with his Albanian counterparts. Instead, among other abuses, he threw leaders of the Albanian community in jail for their activities surrounding the university in Tetova, began to reinstitute Communist-era restrictions on the press and religious practices among, primarily, Muslims and condoned violent repressive measures on the part of the Macedonian police force. Case in point are the massacres of the July 1997 in Tetova, where the Macedonian Special Forces killed several Albanian activists and beat and arrested hundreds of others. There will be little hope for Macedonia as a heterogeneous state if the ethnic tensions, historically evident and immortalized in popular histories of the region, are allowed to rise to the surface. Gligorov initially treaded the thin line between his own virulent nationalist constituents and Albanians who, by-and-large, foresaw Skopje's vulnerability as an opportunity for greater autonomy, and a larger role in Macedonian politics. Unfortunately, as I demonstrated above, Gligorov did not go far enough. It was enough for him to keep the vital borders open by handing over four ministerial seats to Albanians and relying on the influence of the likes of Mirhat Emini.
It is at this juncture that we find the core of the southern Balkans' problems and probably its solution. While these two communities have been rivals since at least the turn-of-the century, neither can rely on neighboring states or "fellow nationals" to help their cause. Unfortunately, the West is not able to internalize such a reality. The West is so consumed by the myth of ethnic tensions and the force of nationalism in the Balkans, that it is impossible for their diplomatic corps to understand shuttle diplomacy does not work in these cases. Albanians in Macedonia would never have responded to Sali Berisha as they did to Mirhat Emini. It is for this reason that the West should double its efforts within Macedonia rather than rely on outside Balkan leaders. Rather than merely restating the West's moral duty, there appears to be an opportunity to successfully address future Balkan conflicts through a deeper understanding of the nature of ethnicity in diverse societies such as Macedonia.
This article attempted to expose the fallacy of the West's understanding of a specific Balkan conflict by emphasizing several important points. First, the issues facing the Skopje government and its rivals are a Macedonian problem. In other words, while the West has essentialized ethnicity and identity to the point that the tensions in Macedonia amount to the next stage of the inevitable clash between "civilizations," there is strong historical evidence to suggest ethnic identity does not necessarily suggest it expands beyond international boundaries. The tensions between Slav Macedonians and their Albanian fellow-citizens are not products of the primordial animosities between "tribes" nor are they extensions of ethnic tensions that can stake universalist claims. They are certainly tensions which are constructed around ethnic signifiers, often stated in essentialist terms by the communities themselves, but one can observe that the parameters of the conflict are closely defined by administrative boundaries which have specific historical as opposed to ethnic significance. Therefore, I insist on isolating the Macedonian conflict between Slavs and Albanians in an attempt to discourage the international communities tendency to simplify conceptions of Balkan politics to one of ethnic hatreds and its (ir)rational exploitation by irredentist demagogues. Instead, I hopefully have demonstrated that while a storm does loom ominously-a storm that uniquely covers Macedonia-it is not likely to spread over the Shar mountains, into Bulgaria, or reflect the "Clash of Civilizations" as has been predicted. Rather, the confrontation between Albanians and Slav Macedonians is to remain threatening over the horizon, as long as the West itself does not encourage its expansion within Macedonia. I conclusively stated that local conflicts such as this one, throughout the Balkans, are not dangerous sparks that ignite the powder keg. Rather, these conflicts are examples of important conflicts of interest, often exaggerated by structural advantages solidified by time and local opportunistic leaders that are containable with intelligent and informed diplomacy and, when necessary, effective bullying, as demonstrated by a combination of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke's forceful diplomacy and NATO's delayed bombing. In other words, the tensions in Macedonia should be policed by the world community in the confined arena of the current adversaries and not through the heavy involvement of third parties.